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Abstract
The challenge to manage a business today is bigger than ever, because we cannot
think only about our organization, but the intricate network of organizations that form our
supply chain. Some organizations cope far better than others with both the prospect and
the manifestation of unquantifiable risk -- they share a critical trait: resilience. This
study researches emergency management organizations which are required to maintain a
state of readiness for immediate reaction, and evaluates best practices in preparedness,
detection, response and recovery. Extracting insights from multiple interviews, this
research verified that most of the current emergency management best practices do
indeed increase resilience without increasing redundancy; consequently, performance is
improved in a cost-effectively way. Applications to supply chain management are made
to recommended enhancements to overall resilience.
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EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BENCHMARKING STUDY: LESSONS FOR
INCREASING SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE

I. Introduction

Background & Motivation
The challenge to manage a business today is bigger than ever, because we cannot
think only about our organization, but the intricate network of organizations that form our
supply chain. As defined by The Global Supply Chain Forum(GSCF), supply chain
management is the integration of key business processes from end-user through original
suppliers that provides products, services, and information that add value for customers
and other stakeholders. As we become more integrated to other organizations expecting
to increase efficiency, we become more dependent on them and more susceptible to
disruptions.
Managing the supply chain of the U.S. Air Force is an increasing challenge as
well, because our budget does not grow proportionally to the costs of modern weapon
systems. Maintaining high performance with this kind of restriction requires evolving
management skills. One way to manage risk and uncertainty in our supply chain is to
apply forecasting techniques to predict our demand, but we cannot anticipate everything
nor afford the cost of excess inventory.
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Some organizations cope far better than others with both the prospect and the
manifestation of unquantifiable risk and they don’t have in common a secret formula, but
they share a critical trait: resilience (Sheffi, 2005a). A resilient enterprise has the
capacity to overcome disruptions and continually transform itself to meet the changing
needs and expectations of its customers (Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2008).

Figure 1. Disruption profile (Sheffi and Rice, 2005)

The disruption profile in Figure 1, presented by Sheffi and Rice (2005) to explain
the supply chain view of a resilient enterprise, is a good example of what happens when
supply chains are disrupted and businesses are impacted, characterizing the nature of the
disruption and the dynamics of the organization’s response by eight stages of disruption:
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1) Preparation: when some kind of warning allows the company to foresee
and prepare for the disruption, minimizing its effects;
2) Disruptive event: when the event happens;
3) First response: aimed to control the situation and avoid further damages;
4) Initial impact: when the performance starts to deteriorate after the
disruptive event;
5) Time of full impact: can be immediate or delayed, but when the full
impact hits the performance drops precipitously;
6) Preparation for recovery: typically start in parallel with the first response
and sometimes before the disruption (when it has been anticipated);
7) Recovery: efforts for getting back to normal operations levels;
8) Long-term impact: the impact can be especially long-lasting and difficult
to recover from when the customer relationships are damaged, but if the
company learn and improve its processes the performance can become better
than before.

More details about building resilient supply chain will be discussed in the
following chapter, but the solutions for the public sector could be different from the
private sector, and most of the literature is focus in the private sector. As an approach to
overcome this issue, we had to look for those organizations in the public sector with the
necessary sense of urgency to plan for disruptions.
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Figure 2. Disaster Management (IRFC, 2010)
In the public sector we can find some organizations that must be prepared for
disasters. By definition from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC, 2010), a disaster is a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the
functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or
environmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its
own resources. They also define Disaster Management as the organization and
management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian aspects of
emergencies, in particular preparedness, detection, response and recovery in order to
lessen the impact of disasters.
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In Table 1 bellow we listed observed similarities between Figure 2’s IRFC (2010)
disaster management phases and Figure 1’s Sheffi and Rice (2005) disruption profile:

Observed similarities
Figure 1
Sheffi and Rice (2005) disruption profile
Disruptive event
Preparation
First response
Preparation for recovery, Recovery

Figure 2
IRFC (2010) disaster management
Disaster
Preparing for disasters
Responding to disasters
Recovering from disasters

Table 1. Observed similarities between Sheffi and Rice (2005) disruption profile and
IRFC (2010) disaster management

Such organizations like FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), State
and Local Emergency Agencies, Hospitals, Fire Departments, Police Departments, and
others are not profit-oriented, but have budget restrictions, as the Air Force, so
management practices similarities are expected.
Emergency management in the United States has faced every kind of disaster:
natural, human-made, and political. The lessons learned from those experiences and the
way the emergency responders’ system was pushed to evolve after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 and hurricane Katrina of August 2005 can be extremely valuable.
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Research focus
The focus of our research is to study organizations that are typically dealing,
directly or indirectly, with emergency situations that could not be prevented. Interview
questions will involve the practices used to be prepared for such disruption event, how
they detect, respond and help in the recovery and mitigation. So we can say that we have
four phases of interest: 1) Preparedness; 2) Detection; 3) Response; 4) Recovery.

Research objectives
The goal is to uncover the best practices of emergency response organizations that
can be applied to improve effectiveness and efficiency of operations, thus creating a more
resilient organization. We expect that our results can be useful for the participants
recommending opportunities for improving their organizational performance.
The purpose is to identify the best practices of the organizations in the typical
activities of emergency management (preparedness, detection, response and recovery)
and improvements they would like to see for the coming years. The same kind of study
will be conducted in the literature.

Theoretical lens
From the literature we can already anticipate some practices that would increase
the resilience of a supply chain. Each practice can be applied in one or more phases,
probably in different levels of importance for each phase.
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First, organizations should create enough sense of urgency between enough
people, avoiding complacency and false urgency (lots of activity that drains needed
energy and produces nothing), to keep people prepared for disruptions (Kotter, 2008).
One thing that can help is to bring customers to meetings, so you can hear directly about
the impact of your decisions and what really matters.
Collaboration between organizations is another way to increase resilience,
allowing them to learn from each other and also to coordinate their efforts in common
operations (Sheffi, 2005b:137).
Agility is another powerful way for achieving resilience, creating networks
capable of faster responses (Christopher and Peck, 2004). Detecting a disaster is not
always easy, the organization should be able to distinguish a true problem from normal
variations of the regular tasks (Sheffi, 2005b:155). Communication is also the key here,
making it easy for suppliers and customers to reach each other and can also empower
frontline employees if they have the appropriate sense of urgency for reacting quickly or
at least alerting the upper levels.
Implementing flexibilities and standardization in an organization are other ways
for avoiding disasters or reacting faster (Sheffi, 2005b:243). Of course there are other
ways to increase resilience, but the cost-benefit of each one must be evaluated. For
example, implementing redundancies may be an undesired solution if it means overly
capacity.
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Methodology
All data was qualitative and collected through face-to-face interviews. Some
participants gave further information through reports, plans and presentations containing
qualitative data to complement their answers. A consistent Interview Protocol was used
for key people of different kind of emergency responder organizations.
The design and methods for the research were based in literature about case
studies and grounded theory construction, not only to design the interview protocol but
also to choose the participants.
The multiple case study approach, selecting different kinds of organizations
across the board of emergency responder organizations, allowed understanding of the
dynamics involved. Typically, multiple case studies provide a stronger base for theory
building (Yin, 2009: 61); the theory is better grounded, more accurate, and more
generalizable (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).
Although a questionnaire was developed for the interview protocol, the focus on
extracting key information required the interview to be more conversational. Interviews
continued until we stopped getting new insights, and ended including eight different
organizations, at State, Regional and Local levels.
The disadvantage of conducting a multiple case study is that it requires extensive
resources and time beyond the means of a single student or independent research
investigator (Yin, 2009:53). Therefore, the sources of evidence were restricted from each
organization, basically relying on interviews and some documentation at the
interviewees’ discretion.

8

Preview of remaining chapters
This chapter provided background information and introduced the problem.
Chapter II will review the literature, looking for known solutions to increase the
resilience of supply chains, as well as studying common practices and trends of
emergency management. This review was also important to gain insight for research
gaps to construct the interview protocol. Chapter III will present the research
methodology used in the study. Chapter IV presents the data collection, analysis and
results. Lastly, Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations for future
research.
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II. Literature Review

Overview
This chapter summarizes the foundational literature used by this research to look
for the best practices and recommended improvements to increase the supply chain
resilience. This begins with a brief overview of definitions and recommendations from
the literature on supply chain management, change management and resilience, and then
focuses on emergency management literature.

Supply chain management overview
The term supply chain management (SCM) appeared first in the beginning of
1980s and become widely used since then (La Londe, 1998). One can find many
different definitions in the literature, but as a management philosophy, Mentzer et al
(2001) proposed the following characteristics for SCM:
- a systems approach viewing the supply chain as a whole, and managing
the total flow of goods inventory from the supplier to the ultimate customer;
- a strategic orientation toward cooperative efforts to synchronize and
converge intrafirm and interfirm operational and strategic capabilities into a
unified whole; and
- a customer’s focus to create unique and individualized sources of
customer value, leading to customer satisfaction.
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In adopting a supply chain philosophy, management practices had to be
established by the firms that allow them to act or behave according to this philosophy.
Mentzer et al (2001) identified many activities that were focused by many authors,
suggesting that they are necessary to successfully implement a SCM philosophy (see
Table 2).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Supply Chain Management Activities
Integrated behavior
Mutually Sharing Information
Mutually Sharing Risks and Rewards
Cooperation
The Same Goal and the Same Focus on Serving Customer
Integration of Processes
Partners to Build and Maintain Long-Term Relationships

Table 2. Set of activities to implement SCM Philosophy (Mentzer et al, 2001)
The organization’s integrated behavior should be extended to incorporate
customers and suppliers (Bowersox and Closs, 1996). This behavior requires mutually
sharing information among supply chain members, especially for planning and
monitoring processes, with frequent information updating among all for effective SCM
(Cooper, Lambert, and Pagh, 1997). Open sharing of information such as inventory
levels, forecasts, sales promotion strategies, and marketing strategies reduces the
uncertainty between supply partners and results in enhanced performance (Andel, 1997;
Lewis and Talalayevsky, 1997; Lusch and Brown, 1996; Salcedo and Grackin, 2000).
Mutually sharing risks and rewards also brings advantage over the long term (Cooper,
Lambert, and Pagh, 1997), as well as cooperation involving cross-functional
coordination across the supply chain members at several management levels.
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Establishing the same goal and the same focus on serving customers is a form of
policy integration (Mentzer et al, 2001), avoiding redundancy and overlapping, while
seeking a level of cooperation that allows participants to be more effective at lower cost
levels (Lassar and Zinn, 1995). This so called policy integration is possible if there are
compatible cultures and management techniques among the supply chain members
(Mentzer et al, 2001).
The implementation of SCM needs the integration of processes from sourcing, to
manufacturing, and to distribution across the supply chain (Cooper, Lambert and Pagh,
1997). SCM also requires partners to build and maintain long-term relationships, in
reality Cooper, Lambert and Pagh (1997) believes that the time horizon of such a
relationship extends beyond the life of the contract, perhaps indefinitely, and the number
of partners should be kept small to facilitate cooperation.
There are also antecedents to SCM that enhance or impede the implementation of
an effective supply chain. According to Mentzer et al. (2001) research, these antecedents
are the willingness to address trust, commitment, interdependence, organizational
compatibility, vision, key processes, leader and top management support. These will
enhance SCM to achieve lower costs, improved customer value and satisfaction, and
competitive advantage.
The concept of SCM continued to evolve. We can see in Figure 3 a more
complex view of SCM by the Global Supply Chain Forum, listing eight cross-functional
and cross-firm processes that they consider to be essential.
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Figure 3. SCM view by the Global Supply Chain Forum
(Lambert, Cooper and Pagh, 1998)
The Supply Chain Council (SCC) has a simpler view of SCM than GSCF, as we
can see in Figure 4, known as the Supply Chain Operations Reference model (SCOR),
based on five core management processes, as we can see in Table 3 (SCC, 2008).
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Figure 4. SCOR model, SCM view by the Supply Chain Council (SCC, 2008:3)

SCOR
Process
Plan
Source
Make
Deliver

Return

Definitions
Processes that balance aggregate demand and supply to develop a course of
action which best meets sourcing, production and delivery requirements
Processes that procure goods and services to meet planned or actual demand
Processes that transform product to a finished state to meet planned or actual
demand
Processes that provide finished goods and services to meet planned or actual
demand, typically including order management, transportation management,
and distribution management
Processes associated with returning or receiving returned products for any
reason. These processes extend into post-delivery customer support
Table 3. SCOR Processes Definitions

Although it is not our purpose to expand on this subject, it is important to state
that both views focus on the implementation of cross-functional processes in the supply
chain, but this research focuses out of those boxes. Smith and Buddress (2005) suggested
a new way to pursue research on SCM that is focused on theory building based on
learned borrowing from other disciplines and how they might be applied to SCM. That is
aligned with the purpose of this research, looking for insights in emergency management
to present thought-provoking paradigms and methods that can be found useful in supply
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chain management. Next, a brief overview of change management will be presented as
an important subject for those who want to apply later findings, as well as an overview on
supply chain resilience.

Change management overview
Changing or reacting to change is hard. The previous overview of SCM practices
and processes can help to respond faster to changes or problems, but having an idea does
not ensure successful implementation.
Goranson (1999) differentiates between agility and flexibility. Agility is the
ability to respond to (and ideally benefit from) unexpected change, an unplanned and
unscheduled adaption to unforeseen and unexpected external circumstances. Flexibility
is the scheduled or planned adaptation to unforeseen yet expected external circumstances.
Flexibility, agility, robustness and resilience are four very related topics in supply chain
risk management.
Kotter (2008), a respected authority on leadership and change, pointed that during
his studies about change in the last eleven years he found that in 70 percent of the cases
where important changes were needed, either they failed or were not fully launched, or
were achieved late, over budget and with great frustration. But in 10 percent of the
situations, the achievements were better than expected, and he observed that in all a
similar formula was used, that he described as eight steps:

15

- Create enough sense of urgency between enough people;
- Form a strong and committed team to guide a challenged change initiative,
even if the members are already overworked or overcommitted;
- Effort by the team to find smart visions and strategies for dealing with the
issue;
- Communication by the team of the visions and strategies to relevant
people, obtaining support and generating more urgency in the
organization;
- Empowerment of those who are committed to turn the vision in reality, by
removing the obstacles in their path;
- Achieve short-term wins that silence critics and disarm cynics;
- Never let up until the vision is a reality, avoid complacency;
- Make change stick by institutionalizing it into the structure, systems and
culture.
(Kotter, 2008)
Kotter (2008) observed that the biggest error when implementing change was
not to create enough sense of true urgency to fight complacency and avoid false
urgency (lots of activity that drains needed energy and produces nothing). So he
developed one strategy and four tactics to increase true urgency, and the focus that must
be used in all moves is to aim not only the minds and thoughts of others, but above all the
hearts of them. A good example is to imagine if Martin Luther King Jr. had announced
on the Washington Mall, “I have a strategic plan.” You have to create full human
experiences, using all our senses, creating the emotional reaction you want, using the
surprise factor and leading others to embrace goals beyond the status quo.
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The Strategy.
Create action that is exceptionally alert, externally oriented, relentless aiming at
winning, making some progress each and every day, and constantly purging low valueadded activities, and always focusing on the heart and not just mind (Kotter, 2008).
The Tactics.
Bring the outside in. Reducing the gap between what is happening on the
outside and what people see and feel on the inside and overtime creating a culture of
external focus, by:
- Listening to customer-interfacing employees;
- Using the power of video (to show at the right time and to the right
people an emotionally and intellectually honest relate of a customer, for
example);
- Not always shielding people from troubling data;
- Redecorating (important information must be on sight, changing
frequently, and visually interesting);
- Sending people out to bring information and feelings (visits, training,
conferences, etc);
- Bringing people in (invite customers and experts to meetings, hire
people that share your vision and bring consultants for a period of
time);
- Bringing data in, but in the right way at the right time (enough info that
feels interesting, surprising or dramatic, from customers, competitors or
about new technologies, in small amounts each day, to as many people
as possible, without fears);
- Not creating a false sense of urgency.
(Kotter, 2008)
Behave with true urgency every day. People must see that you move
with speed, acting with true urgency and don’t just talking about it, you must match
words and deed, never ending meetings without clarity about who will quickly do what
and when. You have to purge low-priority items, cancel distracting projects, delegate and
not allow subordinates to delegate up to you. You must speak with passion and feeling,
17

and make it infective. Behaving urgently does not mean constantly running around and
creating stress for others, that is false urgency, you must be urgent patience. Ask a
trusted colleague to look at all you do to know what you have to change in your behavior
to send the write message (Kotter, 2008).
Find opportunity in crises.
- Always think of crises as potential opportunities;
- Don’t forget that crises do not automatically reduces complacency;
- To use a crisis to reduce complacency make sure it is visible, related to
real business and creates a challenge;
- Develop specific plans of action imagining how people will react, and
implement the plans swiftly;
- Plans and actions must focus others hearts as much or more than minds;
- Do not wait for a crisis to solve your problems;
- If you consider creating a crisis to raise urgency, take care, you can lose
control or people don’t like to be manipulated;
- If you are not on the top, but see the opportunity in a crisis, identify an
approachable and more powerful person, who you can take the lead
with your warnings.
(Kotter, 2008)
Deal with the Urgency Killers. Some people are highly skilled urgency
killers, they will do anything to discredit those who are trying to create a sense of
urgency and to derail processes that attempt to create change. They are more than
skeptics; they cannot be convinced by any evidence, don’t waste time trying to co-opt an
Urgency Killer and never ignore one, otherwise they will certainly work on the backstage
to mine your effort. So you must identify them and use one or more of this three
strategies to deal with them (Kotter, 2008):
- Create an active distraction to an Urgency Killer far away from where
urgency needs to be increased, pairing them with someone who
understands that must keep them away;
- Get rid of them (not always possible);
- Immobilize them with social pressures.
(Kotter, 2008)
18

Sense of urgency is something expected from emergency response organizations
and one of the reasons for choosing them for this research, but to apply any findings to
other organizations the importance to create the desired sense of urgency must be
considered to effectively implement changes.

Supply chain resilience overview
Supply chain networks are inherently vulnerable to disruption and the failure of
any one element in it could cause the whole network to fail. Rice and Caniato (2003)
identified that the first step to create a supply chain network that is both secure and
resilience is to recognize that security is different from resilience. According to them,
actions to improve security can be classified into three categories: physical security,
information security and freight security. However, actions to improve resilience can be
divided into two categories: flexibility and redundancy. In their article they present the
following table (Table 4) with possible actions to increase resilience to disruption and the
correlated advantages and disadvantages. The organization should pursue those
particular responses that make the most sense for them based on a range of operational
and market factors.
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Resilience to
Disruption in …

Action

Advantages

Disadvantages

Use multiple and/pr
local sources in
different locales.

Spreads risk across multiple firms,
multiple locations; local source protects
against international supply shortages.
Known supplier, high supplier
commitment, leveraged volume.

Right parts inventory and risk pooling
may reduce inventory costs.
Reduces part and inventory cost,
complexity.
Pre-disruption relationship ensures
support during crisis.
Efficient transaction with no upfront or
lasting commitment.

Higher cost to qualify supplier, lower
volume leverage, no assurance additional
supplier is more resilient.
Vulnerable to disruption unless supplier has
multiple flexible sites, backup plans.
Potentially higher cost per unit, may entail
fixed costs for “take or pay” committed
volume.
Requires periodic analysis by item as
conditions change.
Costly to modify existing materials
standards.
May need to commit volume to the alternate
modes to get access during disruption
Unknown carrier means added risk,
potential Transportation for high pricing.

Providers have greater leverage and
access.

Requires commitment (volume, cost) and
relationship with logistics provider.

Enables shifting production around
locations.

Requires standardization in production
operations, additional capital for additional
facilities.

Use single source
Supply

Transportation

Production
facilities

Communications

Human
Resources

Contract for supplier
flexibility.
Modify inventory
levels.
Modify product to
use standard parts.
Prepare for and use
multiple modes.
Use spot market for
capacity.
Use logistics
providers to source
transportation.
Use multiple sites,
each making
multiple products.
Modify inventory
levels and policies.
Modify product to
use standard
processes.
Identify and contract
backup production
facilities.
Use full range of
communication
media.

Contract obligates supplier in advance.

Right finished-goods-inventory levels
and risk pooling may reduce inventory
costs.
Leverages common processing
capabilities for lower cost, easy backup
available.

Requires periodic analysis, potential
redesign of supply network.
Costly to modify product and production
processes.

Committed backup assured, potential to
co-locate at supplier or customer.

Not dependable without contingency
contract for the facilities in disruption.

Able to communicate in nearly any
event.

Must maintain a broad range of old and new
technology.
Still requires physical system in event of
full system loss.
Potential delay in immediate response to
massive system disruption.
Requires building, operating, and
maintaining separate system in protected
environment.
Must cross-train employees and modify
work system to utilize multi-skilled
employees.

Back up data.

Protects against data loss.

Contract for backup
IT system.
Set up and operate
parallel or mirrored
IT system.

Provides for near-term system
availability.

Develop crosstrained workers.

Enables shifting of employees and
production as needed.

Modify production
process for unskilled
labor.

Allows rapid increase or decrease in
capacity.

Requires simplification of production
process, not always feasible.

Back up knowledge.

Best practices captured and documented.

Requires significant investment to capture
and maintain knowledge in useful form.

Affords immediate system availability.

Table 4. Supply chain resilience responses by failure mode (Rice and Caniato, 2003)
Resilience should be distinguished from robustness and flexibility. All three are
strategies to address problems of supply chain disruptions, and a best practice supply
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chain is likely to include all three, making it robust, flexible and resilient at the same
time. Asbjornslett and Rausand (1997) defines the following:
Robustness is the ability to accommodate any uncertain future events or
unexpected developments such that the initially desired future state can still be reached.
Flexibility is the ability to defer, abandon, expand, or contract any investment towards
the desired goal. Resilience is the ability of a system to return to its original state or state
or move to a new desirable state after being disturbed.

Figure 5. Differences between robustness, flexibility and resilience (Husdal, 2009)
Husdal (2009) agrees with these definitions, alleging that the three are different
sides of the same coin, yet at the same time very different (see Figure 5). Robustness
refers to the ability to endure changes in the environment without adapting whereas
flexibility is the inherent capability to modify current operations to accommodate and
successfully adapt to such changes. Resilience, in essence, is the ability to survive these
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changes despite severe impact. The Figure 5 from the article synthesizes this idea. The
ability to survive (resilience) is likely to be more important in a business setting than the
ability to quickly regain stability (robustness) or the ability to change course (flexibility
or agility).
Starting with definitions is important, but what this research is looking for are
answers to better prepare a supply chain for a disruption or crisis, and how to react when
the unexpected hits the supply chain. Natarajarathinam et al. (2009) studied 118 peerreviewed and published articles and, although they did not come with a direct answer,
they came with an interesting classification framework. The source of a crisis can be
internal or external. The scale of a crisis may affect only a single company, or the whole
or part of a supply chain, or may have wider and regional impacts. The stage of a crisis
refers to the level of crisis management: mitigation, preparation, response and recovery.
The research methodology used in the literature is sometimes analytical, empirical,
conceptual or applied. The respondents are divided into for-profit and not-for-profit
(e.g. government) organizations, assuming that either organization puts a different value
on crisis management. Table 5 shows how this framework is simple and comprehensive,
using 5 factors and 15 sub-factors to distinguish studies in supply chain. Their review
was based on literature of both SCM and operations research/management science
journals.
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Source
Scale

Stage

Research
method
Respondent

- Internal
- External
- Company
- Supply chain
- Region
- Mitigation
- Preparation
- Response
- Recovery
- Analytical
- Empirical
- Conceptual
- Applied
- For-profit
- Not-for-profit

Table 5. Classification framework for studies in supply chain
(Natarajarathinam et al.,2009)

In the review done by Natarajarathinam et al. (2009), they developed insights
listed in Table 6, identifying some gaps, including the lack of literature on not-forprofit supply chains.
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- There is more research on external sources than internal sources
o More needs to be done on internal sources
- There appears to be more research on the two proactive levels than the reactive
levels
o How to recover needs to receive more attention
- There is limited empirical research on how supply chain managers plan to handle
crises
o There is a need to develop scales for the right level of crisis management
- There is a clear lack of literature on not-for-profit supply chains
o More research is needed for not-for-profit organizations
- Most of the research looks at crises from the perspective of a single member, while
missing the wider picture
o How does a supply chain crisis affect an entire region?
- Many of the models and solutions are developed for a specific crisis (or/and a
specific company or industry)
o What is needed is the development of more generic management tools
Table 6. Natarajarathinam et al. (2009)'s insights and implications
Supporting this concern, Beresford and Pettit (2009) analyzed commercial
logistics’ ideas and solutions in humanitarian supply chains, studying emergency logistics
and risk mitigation in Thailand following the Asian tsunami in 2004. They cite that the
literature on commercial supply chain management is extensive and often related to
specific industries, reflecting the fact that logistics or supply chain solutions may not be
directly transferable between industries, and concluded that commercial logistics is as
well seldom directly transferable to humanitarian logistics.
The idea behind the disruption profile of Figure 1 (Sheffi and Rice, 2005)
presented in Chapter I is not new. The same argument in Einarsson and Rausand (1998)
adds that many companies are blissfully unaware of their vulnerability, and that a risk
and vulnerability analysis is a small step towards better preparedness. Their article shows
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how to do a vulnerability analysis, with the objectives listed below. The focal point of a
vulnerability analysis is the survivability of the system.
-

Identify potential threats to the system
Verify that the vulnerability of the system is acceptable
Verify that the system has adequate security and safety
Evaluate the cost-effectiveness of proposed actions
Aid in establishing an emergency preparedness plan
Help design a robust or resilient system
(Einarsson and Rausand, 1998)

For achieving optimal resilience the vulnerability analysis should be followed by
a capability analysis, as presented by Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton (2008). According to
them, an optimal resilience is defined as the balance between vulnerabilities (fundamental
factors that make an enterprise susceptible to disruptions), and capabilities (attributes that
enable an enterprise to anticipate and overcome disruptions). Optimal resilience occurs
when capabilities are managed to best ﬁt the inherent vulnerabilities of the supply
chain. Deviation from this balance would be considered as a resilience gap, either
eroding proﬁts through excess capabilities or creating excessive risk through less than
optimal capabilities.
Sheffi (2005b) uncovered key themes in how organizations can build resilience in
commercial enterprises. Companies can develop resilience in three main ways:
increasing redundancy, building flexibility, and changing the corporate culture.
Redundancy. In theory, resilience can be built by creating redundancies
throughout the supply chain. The organization could hold extra inventory, maintain low
capacity utilization, have many suppliers, etc, but although redundancy can provide some
room to continue operating after a disruption, typically it is a temporary—and very
expensive—measure. The company must pay for the redundant stock, capacity, and
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workers; moreover, such excesses are likely to lead to sloppy operations, reduced quality,
and significant cost increases. A focus on redundancy actually inhibits an organization’s
ability to achieve efficiency with strategies such as the Toyota Production System, lean
production processes, and Six Sigma practices (Sheffi 2005b).
Flexibility. In contrast, when a company increases supply chain flexibility, it can
both withstand significant disruptions and better respond to demand fluctuations. To
achieve built-in flexibility, a company should take the following actions (Sheffi, 2005b):
- Adopt standardized processes. Master the ability to move production
among plants by using interchangeable and generic parts in many products,
relying on similar and even identical plant designs and processes across the
company, and cross-training employees. Interchangeable parts, production
facilities, and people allow a company to respond quickly to a disruption by
reallocating resources where the need is greatest.
- Use concurrent instead of sequential processes. Employing simultaneous
rather than sequential processes in such key areas as product development
and production/distribution speeds up the recovery phase after a disruption
and provides collateral benefits in improved market responses.
- Plan to postpone. Design products and processes for maximum
postponement of as many operations and decisions as possible in the supply
chain. Keeping products in semifinished form affords flexibility to move
products from surplus to deficit areas. It also increases fill rates and improves
customer service without increasing inventory carrying costs, because the
products can be completed when more accurate information about what the
customer wants becomes available.
- Align procurement strategy with supplier relationships. If a company
relies on a small group of key suppliers, it must maintain a deep relationship
with each. Such suppliers are so vital to an enterprise that the failure of any
among them can have a catastrophic effect on that enterprise. By knowing
each trading partner intimately, a company can better monitor the group to
detect potential problems—and rely on them for help to deal in unforeseen
circumstances. On the other hand, if a company is not closely allied with a
small group of suppliers, its supplier network had better be extensive if it is to
be resilient and responsive to the market. A company with shallow
relationships is less knowledgeable about its trading partners and therefore
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less likely to be forewarned about supply problems. Therefore, maintaining a
large network of arm’s-length suppliers would distribute the risk should a
failure occur. Neither strategy is necessarily correct; the issue is to choose
the approach that aligns a company’s supplier relationships with its
procurement strategy.
(Sheffi, 2005b)
Cultural change. After a disruption, the factor that clearly distinguishes those
companies that recover quickly, and even profitably, from those that falter is corporate
culture. On the surface, they may not seem to have much in common, but these resilient
organizations share several cultural traits (Sheffi, 2005b):
- Continuous communication among informed employees. They keep all
personnel aware of the strategic goals, tactical factors, and day-by-day and
even minute-by-minute pulse of the business. Thus, when a disruption takes
place, employees know the company’s status: what is selling, where the raw
materials are, what it is they were trying to do before the disruption hit, and
so on. They can use that knowledge to make better decisions in the face of
the unforeseen.
- Distributed power, so that teams and individuals are empowered to take
necessary actions. Before a potential disruption is even visible to managers,
those that are thus empowered and are “close to the action” can take
necessary measures; moreover, they can respond quickly, significantly
enhancing the chances of containing a disruption early on.
- Passion for work. Successful companies engender a sense of the greater
good in their employees.
- Conditioning for disruptions. Resilient and flexible organizations are
apparently conditioned, as a result of frequent and continuous “small”
operational interruptions, to become innovative and flexible in the face of
HILP (high impact low probability) disruptions.
(Sheffi, 2005b)
In the following section, ideas from the emergency management literature are
presented to assess and mitigate vulnerabilities, as well as worth capabilities that can
further improve resilience.
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Emergency management
Emergency response organizations have the necessary sense of urgency to
constantly seek for ways to apply the necessary changes to increase the system’s
resilience. Their practices are more applicable to the Air Force as a not-for-profit
organization.
According to FEMA (2009), the disaster life cycle describes the process through
which emergency managers prepare for emergencies and disasters, respond to them
when they occur, help people and institutions recover from them, mitigate their effects,
reduce the risk of loss, and prevent disasters such as fires from occurring.
It is important to explain the roles of state and local emergency management
organizations and their collaborative affiliations with FEMA. The states are given the
responsibility for public health and safety under the U.S. Constitution. The federal
government becomes involved only after the state government has requested assistance or
when it is apparent that the state agencies are or will be unable to fulfill their basic
functions. However, the federal government is the primary source of the funding for
public health and safety programs, with the states and communities as the primary
recipients, resulting in a strong federal presence in emergency management. The
competition for oftentimes scarce resources, coupled with the immediate priorities of
state and local governments, has ensured a strong federal influence in emergency
management – a trend that may be changing (Haddow, Bullock and Coppola 2008: xvi).
See Figure 6 for an overview of activation of federal assistance (DHS, 2008).
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Figure 6. Overview of activation of federal assistance (DHS, 2008)

Hurricane Katrina brought some lessons to avoid the disorder and ineffectiveness
of the government’s response. Haddow, Bullock and Coppola (2008) discussed the
reasons for this chaos to happen in the United States and included the deconstruction of
FEMA, the transfer of significant expertise and financial resources out of FEMA to other
priorities within the Department of Homeland Security, a change at all government levels
from an all-hazards focus to one that favors terrorism above all else, and a lack of
political commitment and leadership to emergency management. The rush by the
emergency community to follow the new terrorism money may have been shortsighted,
but it is understandable because the discipline historically has been dramatically
underfunded (Haddow, Bullock and Coppola, 2008:388).
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The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is known as "the
investigative arm of Congress," supporting the Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and helping improve the performance and accountability of the federal
government for the benefit of the American people. Their report GAO-06-365R (GAO,
2006) identified the following three key lessons to avoid problems in the response as
seem with Hurricane Katrina:
- Clear and decisive leadership. Prior to a catastrophic event, the leadership
roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels must
be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid
and effective decision making, especially in preparing for and in the early
hours and days after the event.
- Strong advance planning, training, and exercise programs. To best
position the nation to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major
catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina, there must be strong advance planning,
both within and among responder organizations, as well as robust training and
exercise programs to test these plans in advance of a real disaster. Although
it is expected a proactive national response in the event of a catastrophe, the
nation does not yet have the types of detailed plans needed to better delineate
capabilities that might be required and how such assistance will be provided
and coordinated. In addition, it was observed that the training and exercises
necessary to carry out these plans were not always developed or completed
among the first responder community. The leadership to ensure these plans
and exercises are in place must come from DHS (Department of Homeland
Security) in conjunction with other agencies, state and local authorities, and
involved nongovernmental organizations.
- Capabilities for a catastrophic event. Response and recovery capabilities
needed during major catastrophic event differ significantly from those
required to respond and recover from a “normal” disaster. Key capabilities
such as emergency communications, continuity of essential government
services, and logistics and distribution systems underpin citizen safety and
security. In addition, as these capabilities are brought to bear, streamlining,
simplifying, and expediting decision making must quickly replace “business
as usual” approaches to doing business. Better contingency plans and the
resources to carry them out are needed to all identified capabilities.
(GAO, 2006)
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One recent article, Stewart, Kolluru and Smith (2009), studied if public-private
partnerships could improve community resilience. In essence they concluded that in
order to achieve community resilience, public and private owners of critical
infrastructures and key resources must work together, before, during and after a
disaster. The key issue is to recognize and embrace the public-private interfaces that can
improve the ability of a community to manage the response and recovery phases of
disaster management. This is important because much of the critical infrastructure
necessary for a disaster response is in private, not in public hands. Of course it depends
on which country the disaster hit, but in much of Europe and particularly in the U.S., it is
true.
Much of the disaster management research relates to social sciences. This type of
research focuses on disaster results, sociological impacts on communities, psychological
eﬀects on survivors and rescue teams, and organizational design and communication
problems. Altay and Green (2006) tried to compile OR/MS research in disaster
operations management. First they defined disaster operations as the set of activities that
are performed before, during, and after a disaster with the goal of preventing loss of
human life, reducing its impact on the economy, and returning to a state of normalcy.
OR/MS was defined as a scientiﬁc approach to aid decision making in complex systems.
Their search resulted in 109 articles. About 44% of all the papers reviewed address
mitigation, with nearly half of them on risk analysis. The article presents Table 7 with
the typical activities of disaster operations management, important to understand the
concerns of the emergency community. Many gaps were identified and suggested for
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future research, and the authors recognized the fact that even the best programs
developed will not be adopted by all participants, due to various reasons including time,
staﬀ availability and interest, funding, personalities, resistance to state intrusiveness, and
denial.

-

Mitigation
Zoning and land use controls to prevent occupation oh high hazard areas
Barrier construction to deflect disaster forces
Active preventive measures to control developing situations
Building codes to improve disaster resistance of structures
Tax incentives or disincentives
Controls on rebuilding after events
Risk analysis to measure the potential for extreme hazards
Insurance to reduce the financial impact of disasters
Preparedness
Recruiting personnel for the emergency services and for community volunteer groups
Emergency planning
Development of mutual aid agreements and memorandums of understanding
Training for both response personnel and concerned citizens
Threat based public education
Budgeting for and acquiring vehicles and equipment
Maintaining emergency supplies
Construction of an emergency operations center
Development of communications systems
Conducting disaster exercises to train personnel and test capabilities
Response
Activating the emergency operation plan
Activating the emergency operations center
Evacuation of threatened populations
Opening of shelters and provision of mass care
Emergency rescue and medical care
Fire fighting
Urban search and rescue
Emergency infrastructure protection and recovery of lifeline services
Fatality management
Recovery
Disaster debris cleanup
Financial assistance to individuals and governments
Rebuilding of roads and bridges and key facilities
Sustained mass care for displaced human and animal populations
Reburial of displaced human remains
Full restoration of lifeline services
Mental health and pastoral care

Table 7. Typical activities of disaster operations management (Altay and Green, 2006)
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Technology implementation can also play an important role as seen in the detailed
framework proposed by Pathan and Hong (2006), who studied of an efficient Disaster
Management Communication and Information System which takes the advantage of
the next-generation wireless networks. While the networks would help for quick and
reliable data delivery from the disaster hotspots, other associated technologies like
disaster prediction or forecasting, databases, web services, intelligent systems, image
processing etc. should work collaboratively for tackling disasters successfully.
Moreover, acquiring secured data at every step is very crucial. Communications and
Information Technologies, skills, and media are essential to link scientists, disaster
mitigation officials, and the public; to educate the public about disaster preparedness;
to track approaching hazards; to alert authorities; to warn the people most likely to be
affected; to assess damage; to collect information, supplies, and other resources; to
coordinate rescue and relief activities; to account for missing people; and to motivate
public, political or institutional responses.
Technology is already a reality in Public Health, with real-time surveillance for
emergency preparedness, as shown by Chretien et al (2009). Public health agencies
conduct surveillance to identify and prioritize health issues and evaluate interventions.
Recently, natural and deliberate epidemics have motivated supplementary approaches to
traditional surveillance methods based on physician and laboratory reporting. Fueled
initially by post–September 11, 2001, bioterrorism-related funding, and more recently
used for detecting natural outbreaks, these systems, many of which are called
‘‘syndromic’’ systems because they focus on syndromes recorded before the diagnosis,
capture real-time health data and scan for anomalies suggesting an outbreak. Although
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these systems as typically implemented have often proven unreliable for detecting natural
and simulated epidemics, real-time health-related data hold promise for public health.
Somers and Svara (2009) alert that professional, local managers must seek to
identify and prepare for all risks, regardless of which threats are receiving official
attention in the programs of the federal and state government and are currently salient to
the public. They also presented seven broad areas, listed bellow, on which local
government managers should focus attention in order to ensure the appropriate handling
of emergency management:
-

Shaping the agenda and focusing attention
Hiring and developing professional staff
Promoting intra- and interorganizational cooperation and coordination
Determining approach to planning and organization
Planning for response and continuity of government
Practicing and fine-tuning plans
Developing an Incident Management System and emergency Operations
Center
(Somers and Svara, 2009)

The concepts and practices of management have changed from a traditional
mindset to a new standard mindset. Now, an emergence mindset is forming, with the
differences shown in Table 8 (Cunha et al., 2001).
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Traditional Mindset
Optimizing
(doing the best with
the best resources)
Planning
Efficiency

New Standard Mindset
Satisficing
(doing the possible with
the available)
Action
Effectiveness

Structure

Integration via
hierarchies
(visible control)

Integration via networks
(invisible control)

Leadership

Authoritarian
leadership

Democratic leadership

Resources
Means
Ends

Emergence Mindset
Bricolating
(do the best with the
available)
Planning and action
Efficient effectiveness
Integration via minimal
networks
(clear responsibilities and
deadlines = minimal controls
= autonomy and flexibility)
Authoritarian democratic
leadership
(managers ensure that
minimal controls are
respected, but accept the
direction of the transient
leader)

Table 8. Comparison of management styles (Cunha et al., 2001)
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III. Methodology

Overview
This chapter summarizes the chosen methodology for organizing the research
design, collecting relevant data and analyzing. This research reviewed literature on
qualitative research and selected a grounded theory construction approach through
multiple case studies. Using guidance from the literature, a series of questions were
constructed for the Interview Protocol. The resultant interviews were the main source of
data. Once the data was collected, a variety of case study and grounded theory
construction analytical tools were employed and used to draw the conclusions outlined in
chapters four and five.

Research Design
Gibbons et al. (1994) argue that we are currently experiencing a fundamental shift
towards the reflexive production of more trans-disciplinary knowledge. In this new
“mode” of production, knowledge is increasingly generated by users in the context of its
application and in the field of management, this mode of knowledge-production system
would bring together the “supply side” of knowledge, including universities, with the “
demand side” , including businesses (Gibbons et al., 1994:7). The effectiveness of the
whole system depends on a rapid interplay between management theory and practice
(Tranfield and Starkey, 1998). Working together in a mutually trans-disciplinary frame,
academics and managers attempt to learn from each other in a virtuous cycle of
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understanding, explication and action (Partingtom, 2000). Academics learn from
managers, processing deeds and words into normative benchmarks and blueprints for
management practice, and in parallel managers learn from academics, developing and
applying practically derived theories (Partington, 2000).
Glasser and Strauss (1967), founders of the term grounded theory, felt a need to
provide a counterbalance to the dominance of the dogmatic concern in sociology with the
rigorous verification of logically derived theories, which had allowed the persistence of a
perceived embarrassing gap between theory and empirical research. In contrast,
grounded theory is derived from empirical data. Glaser and Strauss (1971) offered
four criteria which theory must satisfy to be considered useful: they would fit the real
world; they would work across a range of contexts; they would be relevant to the people
concerned; and they would be readily modifiable.
Partington (2000) states that the twin foundations of grounded theory are
theoretical sampling, where the data collection process is controlled by the emerging
theory, together with the constant comparison method of joint data coding and analysis.
Although Glaser and Straus (1967) state that generated theories may be presented as a
well-codified set of propositions or in a running theoretical discussion, it is the latter
form, characterized by richly descriptive interpretation, which dominates their own work
(Partington, 2000).
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Theoretical sampling, according to Charmaz (2006), means seeking data to
develop your emerging theory with the main purpose of elaborating and refining the
categories constituting your theory. This means conducting theoretical sampling by
sampling to develop the properties of your categories until no new properties emerge.
Consequently , one must saturate categories with data and subsequently sort them to
integrate the emerging theory. The advantage of conducting theoretical sampling is that
it keeps the researcher from becoming stuck in unfocused analyses (Glasser and Straus,
1967). When engaging in theoretical sampling, the researcher seeks people, events, or
information to illuminate and define the boundaries and relevance of the categories, and
because the purpose is to sample to develop the theoretical categories, conducting it can
take the researcher across substantive areas (Charmaz, 2006). Categories are saturated
when gathering fresh data no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new
properties of these core theoretical categories.
This method overlaps with the case study approach and both were used in this
research. According to Yin (2009) case study is an empirical inquiry which focuses on a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context and boundaries between
phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident. The method used was qualitative
with a multiple-case studies design.
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Validity and Reliability
This research quality was applying tactics described by Yin (2009) to increase
construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (definitions on Table
9). The tactics were applied throughout the subsequent conduct of the case studies, not
just at the beginning, so the research design was actually being improved beyond the
initial design plans.

Test
Construct
validity

Definition
Identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied

Internal
validity

Seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are
believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious
relationships. Only for explanatory or causal studies and not for
descriptive or exploratory studies.

External
validity

Defining the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized

Reliability

Demonstrating that the operations of a study, such as the data collection
procedures, can be repeated with the same results

Table 9. Definitions of the four tests for judging research design quality (Kidder and
Judd, 1986)
Yin (2009) recommended for each test the case study tactics listed in Table 10,
and the associated phase of research when the tactic should be used. In the course of this
research, where it was possible, those tactics were applied, when they do not
compromised the exploratory essence of the study. For example, although it was
expected to observe the same kind of practices across the participant organizations, the
research intended not to ignore good practices even if they are only performed by one
organization. That does not change the fact that, for including eight different kind of
emergency response organizations of different sizes and goals, we end up increasing the
validity and reliability of the research.
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Tests

Case study tactic

- use multiple sources of evidence
- establish chain of evidence
- have key informants review draft of
case study report
- do pattern matching
Internal - do explanation building
validity - address rival explanations
- use logic models
- use theory in single-case studies
External
- use replication logic in multiple-case
validity
studies
- use case study protocol
Reliability
- develop case study database
Construct
validity

Phase of research in
which tactic occurs
data collection
data collection
composition
data analysis
data analysis
data analysis
data analysis
research design
research design
data collection
data collection

Table 10. Case study tactics for four design tests (Yin, 2009)
Data Collection
The data collection method used in this qualitative research to look for best
practices in emergency response organizations was intensive interviewing. Charmaz
(2006:25) states that intensive interviewing allows an in-depth exploration of a particular
topic or experience and, thus, is a useful method for interpretive inquiry; its in-depth
nature fosters eliciting each participant’s interpretation of his or her experience. The
interviewer seeks to understand the topic and the interview participant has the relevant
experiences to shed light on it, thus the questions ask the participant to describe and
reflect upon his or her experiences in ways that seldom occur in everyday life (Charmaz,
2006:25). The interviewer is there to listen, to observe with sensitivity, and to encourage
the person to respond; therefore in this conversation the participant does most of the
talking. “Both grounded theory methods and intense interviewing are open-ended but
directed, shaped yet emergent, and paced yet flexible approaches” (Charmaz, 2006:28).
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See the advantages of intensive interviewing for the interviewer in Table 11, and the
advantages for the interviewees in Table 12.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Intensive interviews allow an interviewer to:
Go beneath the surface of the described experience(s)
Stop to explore a statement or topic
Request more detail or explanation
Ask about the participant’s thoughts, feelings, and actions
Keep the participant on the subject
Come back to an earlier point
Restate the participant’s point to check for accuracy
Slow or quicken the pace
Shift the immediate topic
Validate the participant’s humanity, perspective, or action
Use observational and social skills to further the discussion
Respect the participant and express appreciation for participating

Table 11. Advantages of intensive interviewing for the researcher (Charmaz, 2006)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Intensive interviews allow interviewees to:
Break silences and express their views
Tell their stories and give them a coherent frame
Reflect on earlier events
Be experts
Choose what to tell and how to tell it
Share significant experiences and teach the interviewer how to interpret them
Express thoughts and feelings disallowed in other relationships and settings
Receive affirmation and understanding
Table 12. Advantages of intensive interviewing for the research participants
(Charmaz, 2006)
Questions must explore the interviewer’s topic and fit the participant experience,

and should be asked slowly to foster the participant’s reflections, and these kind of
questions are sufficiently general to cover a wide range of experiences and narrow
enough to elicit and elaborate the participant’ specific experience (Charmaz, 2006:28). In
this research, for example, we included in the Interview Protocol questions covering all

41

phases of a disaster: preparedness, detection, response and recovery. When stories
tumble out, all the researcher needs to do is to be receptive and make a few clarifying
questions or comments to keep the story coming, in our research trying to get the best
practices and desired improvements of disaster management. At this point, when
everything works as expected, the Interview Protocol become more a guide to keep track
of what still have to be covered.
At some point this research had to stop gathering data. As already mentioned, the
criteria used to dictate this was to stop when the categories were saturated and no new
theoretical insights were revealed. This happened when we got to 8 different
organizations. But grounded theory saturation is not the same as witnessing repetition of
the same events and stories (Charmaz, 2006). Glasser (2001:191) stated a sophisticated
view of saturation, as follows:
“Saturation is not seeing the same pattern over and over again. It
is the conceptualization of comparisons of these incidents which yield
different properties of the pattern, until no new properties of the pattern
emerge. This yields the conceptual density that when integrated into
hypotheses make up the body of the generated grounded theory with
theoretical completeness.”
Along with the questions in the Interview Protocol Likert scale (Likert, 1932)
items were also included for the main topics, as seen in the Appendix A (Interview
Protocol). The main intention was to use the same items in future surveys to increase
external validity and also to make comparisons between the participant organizations.
Unfortunately, after some attempts, it was observed that those items were responsible to
interrupt the flow of the interview or to make the participant uncomfortable, potentially
affecting the main goal of the research, so they were not used.
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Research Questions
The goal was to uncover the best practices of emergency response organizations
that can be applied to improve effectiveness and efficiency of operations, thus creating a
more resilient organization.
The participants were asked a series of questions relating to the best practices of
their organization in the typical activities of emergency management (preparedness,
detection, response and recovery) and improvements they would like to see in the next 5
years. All participants were engaged in disaster management activities on their
organizations.

Interview Protocol
See Appendix A.
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IV. Analysis and Results

Overview
This chapter presents and explains the analysis and results of this study. First, the
chapter describes the analysis process. For each category (preparedness, detection,
response and recovery) and sub-categories, the bullets indicate typical statements from
the participants of the interviews, explaining how the emergency system works from their
point of view, what challenges exist, and what improvements they expect. These insights
were summarized in a table and were related to emergency management activities and a
brief analysis was executed to relate these best practices with the literature on supply
chain management, change management and supply chain resilience. Coding helped to
visualize the existing relations between emergency management practices and literature.

Analysis description
A necessary step to expedite the analytic work and accelerate productivity was to
write informal analytic notes, commonly called memos. Memo-writing constitutes an
essential method in grounded theory because it prompts the researcher to analyze the data
and codes early in the research process (Charmaz, 2006:72). Through writing memos,
one constructs analytic notes to explicate and fill out categories, helping to think about
the data and to discover ideas about them (Charmaz, 2006:73). See advantages of memowriting at Table 13.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Memo-writing helps you to:
Stop and think about your data
Treat qualitative codes as categories to analyze
Develop your writer’s voice and writing rhythm
Spark ideas to check out in the field setting
Avoid forcing your data into extant concepts and theories
Develop fresh ideas, create new concepts, and find novel relationships
Demonstrate connections between categories
Discover gaps in your data collection
Link data-gathering with data analysis and report-writing
Build whole sections of papers and chapters
Keep involved in research and writing
Increase your confidence and competence.
Table 13. Advantages of memo-writing (Charmaz, 1999)
Charmaz (2006) states that no single mechanical procedure defines a useful memo

and one should do what is possible with the material that he or she has, and any of the
following can be done in a memo:
-

Define each code or category by its analytic properties
Spell out and detail processes subsumed by the codes or categories
Make comparisons between data and data, data and codes, codes and codes,
codes and categories, categories and categories
Bring raw data into memo
Provide sufficient empirical evidence to support your definitions of the
category and analytic claims about it
Offer conjectures to check in the field setting(s)
Identify gaps in the analysis
Interrogate a code or category by asking questions of it.
(Charmaz, 2006:82)
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Coding
Coding means categorizing segments of data with a short name that
simultaneously summarizes and accounts for each piece of data. Codes show how data
was selected, separated, and sorted to begin an analytic accounting of them. The codes
used in this research were related to the four disaster phases: preparedness, detection,
response and recovery. There were also sub-categories that were related to the questions
of the Interview Protocol, like risk assessment, planning, mitigation, etc. Each one will
be addressed in the analysis. See coding for categories and subcategories in Table 14.

Coding for categorizing insights
Code
Category
Ep1 Preparedness
Ep2 - Risk assessment
Ep3 - Planning
Ep4 - Mitigation
Ep5 - Education, training and exercise
Ep6 - Performance indicators
Ep7 - Budgeting and resourcing
Ep8 - Equipment and supplies
Ep9 - Customer relationship
Ep10 - Information system
Ed1 Detection
Er1 Response
Er2 Recovery
Table 14. List of codes for relating insights to emergency management categories
During the analysis the insights of each category were related to the practices of
supply chain management, change management and supply chain resilience literatures.
Table 15 was used to code those relations.
The analysis will indicate topics that are more or less addressed, and maybe
insights that bring a fresh idea to increase resilience.
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Code
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8
C9
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
E1

Related topic
Supply chain management (Table 2 – pg.11):
- Integrated behavior
- Mutually Sharing Information
- Mutually Sharing Risks and Rewards
- Cooperation
- The Same Goal and the Same Focus on Serving Customer
- Integration of Processes
- Partners to Build and Maintain Long-Term Relationships
Change management (pg. 15):
- Create enough sense of urgency between enough people
- Form a strong and committed team to guide a challenged change initiative
- Effort by the team to find smart visions and strategies for dealing with the issue
- Communication by the team of the visions and strategies to relevant people,
obtaining support and generating more urgency in the organization
- Empowerment of those who are committed to turn the vision in reality, by
removing the obstacles in their path
- Achieve short-term wins that silence critics and disarm cynics
- Never let up until the vision is a reality, avoid complacency
- Make change stick by institutionalizing it into the structure, systems and culture
Supply chain resilience (pg. 19):
- Vulnerability analysis
- Capability analysis
- Redundancy
- Flexibility
o Adopt standardized processes
o Use concurrent instead of sequential processes
o Plan to postpone
o Supplier relationship strategy for procurement
- Cultural change
o Continuous communication (distribution of knowledge)
o Distributed power (empowerment of teams and individuals)
o Passion for work
o Conditioning for disruptions
Weak relation to above topics, indicating a new insight from emergency
management to increase supply chain resilience
Table 15. List of codes for relating insights to literature
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Participants’ Demographics
There were eight participant organizations in this research, with demographics as
shown on Table 16:

Organizations
- One state-level emergency agency, where several people from distinct
branches were interviewed, including the Director
- One association of emergency managers, where some members were
interviewed collectively, all with great experience in the area
- One military organization responsible for emergency management on
military facilities
- One regional organization responsible for environmental protection
(hazard materials disposal)
- One local organization responsible for public health
- One local emergency agency
- One private organization (contractor) responsible for supporting surges
of emergency medical services state-wise
- One fire department that also manages preparedness of regional medical
response for all hazards

Participants
10
5
1
2
4
1
2
1

Table 16. Number of participants per organization

They were interviewed in this order, what helped to develop first a big picture of
emergency management (larger organizations) and then explore further details (smaller
organizations and first responders).
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Insights’ Coding and Analysis
Table 17 summarizes the most common insights from the interviews and relates
each one to the literature (Table 15) and emergency management categories (Table 14).
The insights listed on the table were cited by all or most participants, otherwise additional
comments explain the reason for being listed.

#
1

2

3

4

Insight
Preparedness is the most valuable category
Planning and exercise are the most important
sub-categories: an opportunity for integrating
processes, sharing information, building
personal relations, understanding others’
limitations/capabilities, continuous
collaboration and improvement
Bringing people together for planning,
discussing each point collectively with visual
media support and copies of plans for all.
Helps keeping it real, giving an opportunity to
share capabilities and making communication
better during events
Planning reviews are usually mandatory,
frequency ranging from 1 to 4 years (25% per
year), but usually the feedback from events
and exercises naturally results in updates. It is
recommended to have the formal document
signed by higher authorities for commitment.

Code
Ep1|C4|R10

Implications/
Additional Comments
Indicates that one should be
prepared to overcome disruptions

Ep3,5
S2-8
C2-9
R2,3,6,11-14

According to participants bringing
people together plays a huge role for
the importance of both.

Ep3
S2-8|C2-9
R2,3,6,11-13

R7 to this process would spare time,
but important opportunities would
be missed. Personal relationships are
valuable to make people “put
themselves in other shoes.”

Ep3
S3-7
C2-6,9
R10,11

5

Risk assessment to help prioritize actions.
Usually updated when mandated or when
capabilities, vulnerabilities or probabilities of
occurrence changes.

Ep2,4,5,7,8
S4,S7
C2
R2,3

6

Increasing trend of an all-hazard approach for
preparedness. Budget is limited, so this
practice save important resources (grants
allow dual purpose) and time. This way you
can address several hazards with common
scenarios.

Ep2-5,7,8
R6,R7

Reviews are only valuable when
there is a commitment of all
participants, otherwise is just
another useless formality.
Although there is a trend for allhazard approach, this assessment is
considered essential to prioritize
resources and actions. This relates
with the optimal resilience literature.

This approach increases flexibility
and thus resilience.

continued…
Table 17. Summary of interviews’ common insights and their relation to emergency
management, supply chain management, change management and resilience
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Table 17: continued
#

7

8

9

10

11

12

Insight

Code

Exercises seen as extremely important not
only to practice the plan, but also to improve
it through feedbacks, although
recommendations are not enforced.
Exercises as almost the only tool to indicate
performance, but they must be challenging
and complex to make problems visible.
People cannot be worried about looking bad.
Briefing after exercise for feedback is as
important as the exercise itself.

Ep3,5
S2,3,7
C2,6,7,9
R10

Frequent exercises (adding yours and others
you can exercise every 2 months) of different
kinds (tabletop, functional, partial, and full)
and scales. Each is planned in advance
(maximum of one year was observed) and it’s
not a surprise.
Mitigation considered being closer to
recovery, because of political opportunity that
make funds available (avoiding to happen
again). The practice is to have “shelf-ready”
projects to capture funds when they are
available.
When possible, apply the concept of just in
time training, making equipments/processes
easier to be explained (maybe only by
manuals) in field briefings. The amount of
people and the use of volunteers would make
it hard/expensive to train everyone in
advance.
Equipment: they have an information system
that lists and allow orders of assets from
local, state, federal, military and contractors.
If can have in 2 hrs and not using frequently
(risk assessment), don’t buy. Prearrangements are also suggested. Inventory
should be built with info about priorities from
risk assessment and budget. For example,
shots for bio-terrorism for at least first
responders and their families.

Implications/
Additional Comments
A perfectly planned and executed
exercise seems to play an important
role in motivating people to improve
the emergency response plans.

Ep5,6
S3,4
C2-5,9
R10

No other valuable performance
indicator were cited, besides
dispatch times for first responders
and for representatives to arrive at
EOC facility.

Ep5
S2,5,8
C9
R14

The military organization that
participated was the only that
execute a kind of surprise exercise.
They only tell the week it’ll happen
to guarantee maximum attendance,
but they don’t specify day(s), time,
place and kind of threat. Resilience
is increased by conditioning for
them.

Ep2,4,7|Er2
S6
C1
R2,3,6,7,10

Implementing the “shelf-ready”
culture helps to increase the supply
chain agility to respond.

Ep5,Er1
S5,6
C3,4,9
R5,6,8,10

This is a strategy of planning to
postpone training that would
increase resilience by speeding the
response.

Ep2,7,8,10
S2-5,7,8
C4,9
R2,3,8,9,11

This strategy increases resilience but
at the same time avoids redundancy
in the supply chain. Important to
share risks with your partners to
keep the relation balanced.

continued…
Table 17. Summary of interviews’ common insights and their relation to emergency
management, supply chain management, change management and resilience
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Table 17: continued
#

Insight

Code

13

Detection wasn’t a concern; all considered
911 calls, news and weather forecasts to be
good enough to detect disasters. But there are
some other systems, like anthrax detectors in
mail and disease outbreaks controls.

Ep10,Ed1
S2,3,5,6
C2,6
R11,12

14

15

16

Customer relationship through participations
of emergency managers on citizens’ councils
and meetings. Larger agencies almost
consider the local agencies and first
responders as their customers.
Response. It is the same people, just change
hats. Suggestion to document everything you
do (to help recovering the money later).
Liaisons have an important hole to help
locals, adding experience. Use of Emergency
Operation Centers (people with authority to
commit resources of their organizations
working together and directly – not through
EOC director every time). Group start to
think about recovery in advance.
Most would like maps and visual. Just in time
training. Briefings and refreshers before
going to field. Extremely important to know
each other before an event (improves
communication).
Recovery. Should start with the response with
a team doing damage assessment. Priority is
to capture funds and keep money coming,
recovering the critical infrastructure to let
private sector do what they do best. If you
exceed, people will stop doing their part and
expect everything from you. Customers
should also make their own plans.
Opportunities for mitigation should be
pursued.

Ep9
S2,3,5,6
C2,C8
R11

Ep3,5
Er1,Er2
S2-8
C2-6
R6

Ep4,7,9
Er1,Er2
S2,4,5-8

Implications/
Additional Comments
Disruptions are not always so easy
to timely detect. The lesson here is
to give power for end-users to alert
you, to observe trends in the
economy (performance of your
suppliers) and to develop forecasts
for your demand.
It is important to bring the outside
into your organization, increasing
the focus on serving the customer.

Involvement of the same people
through all processes, from planning
to recovering, helps to improve the
processes. Local responders that are
not used with a disruption should be
assisted, to avoid over confidence, a
common problem of inexperienced
managers (according to
participants).

Interesting point about sticking with
your scope of responsibility,
otherwise your partners in the
supply chain get used to not do their
part concurrently, just waiting for
you to handle everything.

continued…
Table 17. Summary of interviews’ common insights and their relation to
emergency management, supply chain management, change management and resilience
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Haddow, Bullock and Coppola (2008) states that preparedness within the field of
emergency management can best be described as a state of readiness to respond to a
disaster, crisis, or any kind of emergency situation; and that preparedness is not only a
state of readiness but also a theme throughout most aspects of emergency management.
Therefore it was not a surprise that this topic dominated the research’s Interview Protocol
and the participants’ awareness, therefore it was sub-divided in sub-categories.
On the next and final chapter this research will explore the challenges of doing
this research, the managerial implications of the results, limitations of the research and
suggestions for future research.
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Results in the Disruption Profile

Closing this chapter, a list of best practices from emergency management was organized
according to the disruption profile of Sheffi and Rice (2005). See Figure 7 and Table 18.
Emergency management best practices applied to Sheffi and Rice’s (2005) Disruption
Profile
.

Figure 7. Disruption profile revisited (Sheffi and Rice, 2005)
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Emergency Management Lessons in Each Phase #
of the Disruption Profile: Increasing Supply Chain Resilience
Risk assessment to prioritize actions/plans/training/resources; Adopt an allhazard approach when possible, one solution for multiple problems;
Planning and reviewing plans collaboratively together; Bringing people
together is an opportunity for integrating processes, sharing information,
understanding others limitations/capabilities, building personal
1
Preparation relationships and continuous improvement; Frequent exercise as a indicator
of performance and source of feedback to improve resilience, but must be
challenging and complex to bring problems; Share information about
equipment available; Prepare shelf-ready mitigation plans to use when
funds become sudden available.
Give power to your customers to alert you about the occurrence of a
2
Detection
disruption; Try to develop controls to detect variations from the standard.
Send someone to help and to keep you informed; Use of briefings and
refreshers to activate response plans; Keep Liaisons close to important
3, 4
partners; Just in time training; Activate operation center team with
First
authority to commit resources from their organizations; Document
response
everything you from the beginning, you can recover the money latter; Form
team for recovery efforts.
Recovery team should start damage assessment to use in recovery efforts;
priority is to capture funds and keep money coming; use the opportunity of
5, 6, 7
Initial
political pressures to activate mitigation plans with available funds and
recovery
avoid future disruptions; Recover critical structure first to let private sector
do what they do best.
Don’t exceed, or customers/partners will stop doing their part and expect
8
everything from you; Customers should also make their own plan;
Long term
Opportunities for mitigation should be pursued; Lessons learned should be
recovery
shared and plans should be updated, get feedbacks.
Table 18. Emergency management best practices applied to Sheffi and Rice’s (2005)
Disruption Profile
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V. Conclusions

Overview
On this final chapter it is explored the managerial implications of the results, the
challenges conducting this research, limitations of the results and suggestions for future
research.

Managerial implications
On the previous chapter many insights from emergency management related to
increasing the supply chain resilience were listed on Table 17 (pp.49-51). As stated in
earlier chapters, the importance of observing emergency response organizations was that
most of them are also on the public sector (not-for-profit) and their cultures have an
innate sense of urgency to constantly improve their processes and the ability to prepare
for the unexpected.
The least observed characteristic to improve resilience from their insights was
increasing redundancy. Most were related to risk assessment (vulnerabilities vs.
capabilities analysis), increasing flexibility and changing culture. This means a focus on
cost-effectiveness that we can mirror in our organization without incurring in taking more
risks.
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Challenges Conducting the Research
Conducting a qualitative research based on face-to-face interviews was
challenging and it was essential to use the approach of ground theory construction,
therefore one can start the analysis of the data before finishing the collection. This helped
to improve the questions and explore details about contradictory views, and also to
increase validity of the research’s results.
It was a coincidence, but an almost top-down collection of data (from larger
organizations to smaller ones) was conducted, and although nothing on the literature was
found about it, the feeling was that it allowed to better contrast visions and explanations,
starting from the big picture of larger organizations (focus on planning and supporting
first responders’ organizations) and ending with local organizations (focus on citizens’
demands and community vulnerabilities/capabilities).

Limitations of results
External validity can be an issue because all organizations were from the same
state and they were close enough to share the same culture and to maintain personal
relationships and conduct face-to-face meetings.
Another issue was that although data was collected from multiple organizations
across the board of emergency management, only one source of evidence (interviews)
was observed, what could impact the construct validity of the research. Unfortunately for
security reasons most organizations could not give access to their data.
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Suggestions for Future Researches
First suggestion would be to improve the validity of the results, maybe through
the application of a survey based on the results with emergency responders of different
states and countries.
Another suggestion, that in reality came from one of the interviewees, would be to
do a case study about utility companies, that supposedly know how to move around, have
a plan, know how to do with less, have pre-arrangements with each other, and move
equipment effectively and efficiently. Certainly their symbiosis of private practices with
public services can be explored.
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol

Purpose of the study: To uncover the best practices of emergency response
organizations that can be applied to improve effectiveness and efficiency of operations,
thus creating a more resilient organization.
Benefits: You will receive a copy of the final report, including an executive summary
supporting opportunities for improving your organizational performance.
Experimental procedures: You will be asked a series of questions relating to the best
practices of your organization in the typical activities of emergency management
(preparedness, detection, response and recovery) and improvements you would like to see
in the next 5 years. This will take approximately 1 hour.
Participation: Your participation is completely voluntary.

Your decision to not

participate or to withdrawal from participation will not jeopardize your relationship with
AFIT, USAF, or the DoD. Thank you for participating in this project.
Confidentiality: Your responses to this assessment will be kept strictly confidential by
the research team in AFIT. You will be given the opportunity to add/remove comments
and clarify any items prior to analysis. Additionally, your name and your organization
will not be cited.
Questions: If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Capt. Jose Morais at
jmorais@afit.edu, (937) 321-1009, Bldg 641, Room 201E, 2950 Hobson Way, Air Force
Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7765.
www.afit.edu/en/ens
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A routine emergency event is typically managed with the resources of a single
governmental agency, or partial resources from several, using standard procedures, and
with minimal dislocation. Operationally, the transition to a higher category of emergency
occurs when resources become stressed, when non-standard procedures must be
implemented or when special authorities must be invoked to manage the disaster event.
Considering preparedness, detection, response and recovery as the typical
activities of disaster operations management, this interview is designed to find out what
are the best practices to deal not only with routine emergency situations but also with
major disasters.
For the following topics, focus on the practices that you are proud to perform
today and the improvements that you would like to see in the next 5 years.

Text in red will appear as a guide to the researcher, to assure that all the
information expected will be collected, besides the already mentioned “best practices”
and “improvements”.
Text in blue will indicate the expected answer.
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1) Preparedness
a. Risk Assessment
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

How are threats assessed?
How are capabilities assessed?
How are vulnerabilities assessed?
How are risks assessed?
How frequently are assessments reviewed?
What defines an acceptable level of risk?
How would you evaluate your organization risk assessment?
Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Average

Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

b. Planning
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.

What do you consider valuable in the existing plans and in the planning
process?
What improvements would you like to see in the next 5 years in the plans
and in the planning process?
Is there a plan for each emergency scenario?
How are the typical activities of emergency management (preparedness,
detection, response and recovery) covered? Does each one have its own
plan?
How are the plans prioritized?
Example: by probability of occurrence.
Do the plans include checklists and step-by-step procedures?
What is the frequency of review/update of the plans?
Are there feedbacks from events that promote immediate effort to update
the plans?
How are the plans disseminated?
How would you evaluate your organization planning?
Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Average
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Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

c. Mitigation (reducing risk)
i.
ii.
iii.

iv.
v.

vi.
vii.

How are opportunities of risk-reduction identified?
How are risk-reduction actions prioritized?
How these opportunities are implemented?
Examples: direct/indirectly, giving assistance to other organizations,
insurance (transferring the risk to the insurance company), financial
incentives, structural controls, hazard identification and mapping, land-use
planning, design and construction applications, etc.
How frequently opportunities are investigated?
What are the major impediments to mitigation?
Examples: denial of the risk, political will, costs and lack of funding,
disagreements, etc.
Should mitigation funding be tied to individual disasters or should it be
independent of disasters altogether?
How would you evaluate your organization contribution to reduce risks?
Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Average

Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

d. Education, Training and Exercise
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.

What is the target audience for education, training and exercise programs?
What kind of interaction with other organizations exists for each program?
What is the frequency of review/update of each program?
What is the frequency of application of each program?
In what extent the plan for each possible event are covered?
Example: depends on the probability of occurrence, etc.
In what extent the personnel are covered?
Example: 100% every year, etc.
How are feedbacks from education, training and exercise incorporated?
How would you evaluate your organization education, training and
exercise programs?
Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Education
Training
Exercise
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Average

Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

e. Performance indicators
i.

What current performance indicators do you consider valuable?
Examples: the number of agency plans developed, reviewed and updated;
the number of emergency preparedness trainings and exercises conducted;
the number of items identified and completed as a part of Corrective
Action Plans; the number of agency staff, volunteers and stakeholders
participating in emergency preparedness training; etc.

ii.
iii.

What indicators would you like to see implemented in the next 5 years?
How would you evaluate the current performance indicators of your
organization’s preparedness?
Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Average

Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

f. Budgeting / Resourcing
i.
ii.

Is there anything that you do not have sufficient funds?
Do you feel limited by any resource?
Examples: personnel, etc.

g. Equipment and supplies
i.

ii.

What do you consider to be the current best practices performed by your
organization in acquisition, maintenance, distribution and inventory of
equipment and supplies?
Examples: Supplier relationship management, demand forecast, shared
inventory, flexibility, backup, etc.
What improvements would you like to see in the next 5 years in managing
equipments and supplies?

h. Customer relationship
i.

ii.

What do you consider to be the current best practices performed by your
organization in the relationship with your customers?
Examples: Partnership with the media; meetings with local councils;
website; etc.
What improvements would you like to see in the next 5 years in the
relationship with your customers?
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i. Information systems
i.
ii.

What are the roles of information systems in your organization?
What improvements would you like to see in the next 5 years?
Example: new technologies that you would like to incorporate, etc.

j. Preparedness
i.

What do you consider to be the best practices performed by your
organization in preparedness today?
Example: details about threat/vulnerability/risk assessment, identification
of shortfalls between current preparedness and the requirements of an
appropriate preparedness posture, implementation of enhancements,
training, education, exercise, performance indicators, planning, etc.

ii.

What improvements would you like to see in the next 5 years to your
organization preparedness?
How would you evaluate the overall preparedness of your organization?

iii.

Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Average

Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

2) Detection
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

How often do you test the detection system?
How long does it take to detect after the event happened?
How are false alarms prevented?
How long to confirm it is not a false alarm?
What do you consider to be the best practices performed by your organization to
detect an emergency event today?
f. What improvements would you like to see in the next 5 years to improve your
organization’s ability to detect an emergency event?
g. How would you evaluate your organization’s ability to detect the occurrence of an
emergency event?
Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Average

67

Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

3) Response
Consider for the following items not only routine emergencies handled only by your
organization also situations that need a joint involvement of other organizations.
a. How are plans activated?
b. How much time it takes between the detection of an emergency and the
deployment of the first responders?
c. Who do you usually work with?
d. What changes occur in the work force during an event as compared to the
preparedness phase?
Help of volunteers; changes in effort (ex: working hours), etc.
e. How can the hierarchy between the responders be described?
Examples: Coordination (all in the same hierarchy level) or Command & Control.
f. How are communications between responders performed?
g. How would you evaluate the responders’ communications?
Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Average

Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

h. What kind of backup systems do you have?
i. What do you consider to be the best practices performed by your organization to
respond to an emergency event today?
Examples: Roles and responsibilities are well defined; contribution of volunteer
organizations; communication between response agencies; flexibility;
standardized procedures; interoperable communications; establishment of a
command post; etc.
j. What improvements would you like to see in the next 5 years to improve your
organization’s ability to respond to an emergency event?
Examples: Better communications among responding agencies to compensate
overlapping responsibilities and unclear delineation; Joint Information Center;
etc.
k. How would you evaluate your organization’s ability to respond to an emergency
event?
Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Average
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Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

4) Recovery
a. What do you consider to be the current best practices performed by your
organization for the recovery?
Examples: Details about going back to normality and about learning about
vulnerabilities; etc.
b. What improvements would you like to see in the next 5 years to improve your
organization contribution for the recovery?
c. How is the experience shared back to the preparedness phase?
d. How would you evaluate your organization’s contribution for the recovering from
disasters?
Extremely
Poor

Bellow
Average

Average

Above
Average

Excellent

DON’T
KNOW

Is there anything you would like to add?
Examples: comments on preparedness, detection, response, recovery, etc.

You will receive a transcript of this interview and have the opportunity to
add/remove comments and clarify any items prior to analysis. The final report with
my findings will be delivered to you by the end of March, 2010.
Thanks for your cooperation.
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Blue Dart
Author: Capt Jose M. Morais Jr. , Student, AFIT
Contact: timothy.pettit@afit.edu
Word Count: 358
The challenge to manage a business today is bigger than ever, because we cannot
think only about our organization, but the intricate network of organizations that form our
supply chain. As we become more integrated to other organizations expecting to increase
efficiency, we become more dependent on them and more susceptible to disruptions.
Managing the supply chain of the U.S. Air Force is an increasing challenge as well,
because our budget does not grow proportionally to the costs of modern weapon systems.
Maintaining high performance with this kind of restriction requires evolving management
skills. One way to manage risk and uncertainty in our supply chain is to apply
forecasting techniques to predict our demand, but we cannot anticipate everything nor
afford the cost of excess inventory.
Some organizations cope far better than others with both the prospect and the
manifestation of unquantifiable risk -- they share a critical trait: resilience. A resilient
organization has the capacity to overcome disruptions and continually transform itself to
meet the changing needs and expectations of its customers , but the solutions for the
public sector could be different from the private sector, and most of the literature is
focused in the private sector. As an approach to overcoming this issue, this research
looks for organizations in the public sector with the necessary sense of urgency to plan
for disruptions: emergency management organizations which are required to maintain a
state of readiness for immediate reaction. The goal was to uncover the best practices of
emergency response organizations in preparedness, detection, response and recovery that
can be applied to improve effectiveness and efficiency of operations, thus creating a more
resilient organization.
Extracting insights from multiple interviews, this research verified that most of
the current emergency management best practices do indeed increase resilience without
increasing redundancy; consequently, performance is improved in a cost-effectively way.
One example was the importance of planning and exercising, both bringing people
together for an opportunity to integrate processes, share information, build valuable
personal relations, and to understand other’s limitations/capabilities. Therefore,
implementation of identified best practices can contribute to inducing continuous
improvement and increasing collaboration toward a new level of resilience.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US
Government.
March 2010
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Captain of the Brazilian Air Force (BAF), Undergrad in Electronic Engineering,
working since 2003 in the BAF Directorate of Aeronautic and Bellicose Materiel, which
has a role equivalent to AFMC. There I was responsible for planning and budgeting
acquisitions of avionics and also responsible to help in contract negotiations of
acquisition and maintenance. I was also responsible to consolidate the flight cost per hour
of BAF aircrafts and analyze data in our Information Systems.
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